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Exploring the scope of science advice: social
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ABSTRACT Science advice is normally seen in the context of physical science advice, and
in particular in relation to the institutional position of “Chief Scientiﬁc Advisor” (CSA). This is
true for the academic literature covering the science-policy interface, public administration,
science and technology studies as well as most practitioner commentary. Very little literature
exists on the provision of social science advice for public policy, insofar as this is framed in
terms of individuals providing expertise within an institutional setting and role, as opposed to
the provision of (social science) evidence within “evidence-based policy-making” or similar.
This focus on the science advice has thus shaped the understanding of what a science advisor
does, and what skills and expertise they are providing. Conventionally, this comprises an
emphasis on signiﬁcant knowledge in an area of expertise, a level of seniority and “eminence”
to enable that knowledge to be inﬂuential and a degree of independence from those tasked
with making policy decisions. Social science advice exists in the UK national policy-making
context, but the mode of operation places a different emphasis and role on those providing
such advice. I explore the nature of this role, using the conventional idea of the CSA as a point
of departure to foreground points of similarity and difference. This exploration reveals a
broader operating space for science advice than is conventionally understood and fore-
grounds particular tensions between relevance and inﬂuence, on the one hand, and scientiﬁc
objectivity and independence, on the other. This article is published as part of a thematic
collection dedicated to scientiﬁc advice to governments.
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Introduction
Academic debates surrounding “science advice” and thediscourse around the related idea of the “science-policyinterface” are almost exclusively discussed in the context
of physical or natural sciences providing the advice, rather than
the social sciences. This focus is visible across a range of different
literatures approaching the notion of science advice from slightly
different perspectives. Within science policy, Pielke’s (2007)
book The Honest Broker is set within a context of physical
science examples—“tornado politics” versus “abortion politics”.
In science and technology studies Jasanoff’s (1994) The Fifth
Branch is pitched explicitly around issues framed in physical
science terms: “[s]hould we eat supermarket apples, use hairspray,
drive cars in inner cities, incinerate our wastes, generate nuclear
energy…” she asks rhetorically in the preface. In the literature on
the science-policy interface, a review by Spruijt et al. (2014) opens
with a framing of their paper on “synthetic biology, antimicrobial
resistance and nanotechnology” (17), and Schwach et al. (2007)
focus explicitly on ﬁsheries systems. In public policy, Weale
(2001) opens with reference to xenotransplantation and human
embryo cloning, and in the politics of science literature Millstone
and van Zwanenberg (2001) highlight issues in science advice
around the bovine spongiform encephalitis crisis that gripped
the UK government in the 1980s. A similar slant is visible in the
related public administration literature. Despite an attempt to
present expertise in conceptually neutral terms—enabling the
deﬁnition to include both social and physical science—Page’s
(2010) analysis of expertise ends up with a stronger emphasis on
physical rather than social science. For instance, he classes
scientiﬁc expertise as economics, veterinary and epidemiology
expertise (259). Later examples include expertise in marine
biology (262), materials science (264), medicine (265) and
chemistry (268). Indeed, Page directly highlights the “natural
sciences” in this context, drawing on literature framed in this way
as evidence for the limited power of such expertise in policy-
making. Nevertheless, the strength of Page’s approach is the
broader sense of “scientiﬁc expertise” deployed—one that
includes economics and planning—and the construction of
tableaux that provide useful points of departure for under-
standing science advice more generally. Consequently, I will
return to Page’s tableaux below when considering the role of
social scientists explicitly as scientiﬁc experts in policy-making.
In addition to the analysis of science advice in vivo, there is
signiﬁcant commentary in the science literature about science
advice. This typically comes either from eminent physical
scientists (for example, Gluckman, 2014) or is made in reference
to the role of what the United Kingdom calls “Chief Scientiﬁc
Advisors” (CSAs)—itself a role that is most commonly associated
with scientists from the physical sciences (for example,
Doubleday and Wilsdon, 2012). Essentially, there is very little
discussion about the role of social sciences in science advice
practice. What is more typical, if not also a little ironic, is that
social science is presented as the science of science advice
(Jasanoff, 2013), where in some sense it can be seen as acting as
the “conscience” of physical science. This role is similar to that set
out by Petersen et al. (2011), where such expertise has a role in
helping to manage risk as part of an “extended peer community”
in postnormal science terms. While both are important roles,
there is a danger of social sciences only being seen as a peripheral,
mediating role in science advice equivalent to journalists at the
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (Maxwell, 2014).
This focus on science advice as physical sciences and
engineering advice is thrown into sharp relief in the 2013
reﬂective policy report Future Directions of Science Advice in
Whitehall (Doubleday and Wilsdon, 2013), where a speciﬁc
chapter is devoted to a call for a UK Chief Social Scientist
(Cooper and Anderson, 2013). This chapter reﬂects one of the
few times social science surfaces the context of being part of the
discussion around science advice, as opposed to being (in some
sense) a “regulator” of science advice. However, in the same
volume the authors ask:
Do we settle for one social scientist coordinating everything at
the centre? Or do we instead push for a more ambitious, cross-
departmental network, parallel to that of the CSAs? And why
stop there? There are already chief economists in most
departments, connected through the Government Economic
Service to HM Treasury, the real heart of epistemic authority
in Whitehall. (Doubleday and Wilsdon, 2013)
The curiosity of this statement, ostensibly from the heart of
the UK science advice community, based in a national policy-
making infrastructure widely recognized as at the forefront of
science advice globally is the absence of recognition of the
existence of departmental Chief Social Researchers (or, at least,
“Heads of Profession for Government Social Research” as they
are often known)—and a wider, professional Government Social
Research network in Whitehall, as widespread (geographically if
not numerically) as economists. Further, between 2002 and 2007
Whitehall paid host to a single, non-departmental Government
Chief Social Researcher—Sue Duncan—whose role was to
champion social research in government on the back of a push
from the the Blair-led New Labour government to drive
evidence-based policy-making (Burnett and Duncan, 2008).
This post has continued, but has been diluted: the role is now
played by the most senior social researchers in Government,
sometimes in a shared role and effectively done part-time
alongside their day jobs within their parent ministry. This of
course contrasts with the approach taken by the Government’s
CSA(GCSA), but not (for instance) with the Government
Economics Service (GES).1 Therefore, in a sense the government
social research (GSR) service has moved from a position similar
to the GCSA to one common with GES, GSS (the Government
Statistical Service) and GORS (the Government Operational
Research Service).
Implicit within the description of the literature above are two
issues. One is a contrast between high-proﬁle, physical science
advice, encapsulated in the role of the CSA—the “charismatic
megafauna of science advisory systems” as Doubleday and
Wilsdon (2013) so aptly put it—and the lower-proﬁle, social
science advice that exists and which I was part of for over a
decade. Within the latter—social science advice—a second issue
emerges, foregrounding a different emphasis on the modus
operandi. Social science advice is “social research” in the UK
government. The emphasis is on methodological expertise that
leads to a quite distinct mode of operation for social science
advice practitioners, effectively complementing the model of
science advice embodied within CSAs—where the emphasis is on
“science and engineering evidence” (Government Ofﬁce for
Science, 2015: 6). Importantly, as I will argue, understanding
the role of social science as “social research for government”
challenges the implicit boundaries set-up around science advice as
commonly debated in the academic literature. By exploring these
boundaries through the case analysis of government social
research in the United Kingdom, I aim to set out potential
parameters for assessing the effectiveness of science advice in
practice. In doing so, I will foreground central tension in this area:
that the inﬂuence of science is grounded in both its perceived
objectivity and independence (as sketched by Pielke’s “honest
broker”) and in its need to be relevant and legitimate, which are
require adopting a policy perspective thus limiting objectivity and
independence (Cash et al., 2003).
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The (un)importance of academic disciplines
The description above incidentally foregrounds the role of
disciplinary afﬁliation in the exploration of science advice. It is
important that this should not be read as another attempt to pitch
the physical and social science disciplines against each other.
Rather the opposite: the social sciences and physical sciences are
complementary in this setting and institutionally have been
brought together in single institutions (for example, the Royal
Society of New Zealand, where there are also CSAs drawn across
the physical and social sciences). In addition, my own research is
focused on the integration of research across social and physical
sciences (e.g. Love and Cooper, 2015). The fact that mainstream
debate on science advice is focused almost exclusively on physical
science is likely more a function of distinctiveness of issues that
science advice in this context serves. This distinctiveness arises
out of contrast with the more standard problems of economic
growth, employment, welfare, social justice and inequality that
public policy commonly addresses. These problems are also the
focus of much of social science (including economic) research, so
it makes sense that social science advice is less distinctive in
comparison with the more “stand out” physical science advice.
This conceptualization of science advice in the mainstream
literature is even more relevant when put into context of the role
of social sciences and physical science in providing science advice
for government. “Science advice” brings to mind the role of CSAs
who are placed mainly in the 16 ministries. However, with a few
exceptions, the vast majority of science advice across these
ministries is provided by social science (in terms of budgets for
research and in the numbers of staff with social science
backgrounds). However, in the wider policy-making bodies,
physical science far outweighs social science as issues of policy
delivery in such areas as environment, agriculture, drugs,
medicine and veterinary services demands. These staff form
part of what is known in the United Kingdom as Government
Science and Engineering, which has the Government CSA as
its head.
The aim of the analysis is to explore the extent to which this
focus on the distinctive variety of science advice has deﬁned the
boundaries and nature of science advice in the literature, what it
constitutes and what makes for good science advice. Through
foregrounding the role of social science advice in the UK
government, I intend to surface a distinct mode of science advice
operation that addresses the innate tensions that exist in science
advice, tensions identiﬁed by Schwach et al. (2007) in their
exploration of the use of science advice in relation to EU ﬁsheries
policy, Cash et al. (2003) with respect to knowledge systems for
sustainability and Kieser and Leiner (2009) in social systems and
management research. This tension begins with the need for
science and evidence from it to be rigorous, objective, impartial if
it is to be credible and therefore inﬂuential. But to have policy
impact, such evidence needs to be relevant or salient to policy
teams, features that are promoted by taking a policy perspective
(that is, not purely objective), and delivering bespoke evidence on
the practical terms deﬁned by policy customers: within budget
and on time. However, in so taking on these features, they can
directly undermine the credibility of the evidence generated.
These are issues I address directly in the following section.
Comparing and contrasting approaches to science advice
As noted above, in the United Kingdom the vast majority
of social science advice provided to policy in the 16 major
policy-making ministries is provided via a cadre of full-time civil
servants who occupy posts reserved for those with a background
in the social sciences. This cadre is known ofﬁcially as the GSR
service, and has its own recruitment and promotion criteria and
standards of behaviour and practice in addition to those of so-
called “generalist” civil servants.2
In exploring the role of the GSR, important features of science
advice are thrown into relief when it is set next to the role
of departmental CSAs—representing the mainstream notion of
science advice. In so doing, the standard conceptualization of
science advice is questioned, and its boundaries redrawn.
To undertake this contrast, it is important to understand the
civil service context in which GSR operates as this provides an
important backdrop for highlighting the tensions inherent in
science advice.
Method. Much of the following analysis is based directly on my
personal experience as a senior member of the GSR from
December 2002 until September 2013. The experience encom-
passes my time as an entry level member of GSR for 2 years
(2002–2004) in the then Department for Education and Skills,
and as a member of the senior leadership from 2006 until 2013 in
the Departments of Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS), and the
Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC). These years
as a senior member of the GSR were marked by particular
experiences in relation to the role of CSAs: in DCMS, there was
no CSA at the time and I was directly involved in the creation of
that post and related infrastructure, including at times attending
central CSA meetings (where all departmental CSAs meet) for
DCMS. In DECC, my role as the Head of Social Science
Engagement was based in a team created by the then DECC CSA.
As such, I was able to see at ﬁrst hand how some CSA processes
operated and how particular CSAs carried out their role. Of
course, this does mean that my limited exposure to CSAs in other
key departments does prevent me from providing detailed
insights drawn from those wider contexts.
As a consequence of drawing on my direct personal experience,
especially those examples where I am a key actor, part of my
analysis is based on what Anderson (2006) terms “analytic
autoethnography”. The deﬁning features of analytic autoethno-
graphy are where the researcher is (1) a full member in the
research setting under consideration; (2) visible as such a member
in writing about the research setting; (3) committed to
augmenting theoretical understanding of social phenomena. Part
of the analysis presented here fulﬁls all these criteria.
The remainder sits more closely to standard participant
observation, central to the ethnographic method, similar to that
deployed by Stevens (2010) in a closely related context. However,
unlike standard, formal approaches to participant observation
and analytic autoethnography where contemporaneous notes,
interviews and systematic collection of other data are standard
practice, my data are drawn through a combination of recollected
illustrative episodes and impressions arising out of multiple
interactions crossing a number of years. The clear limitation in
this approach is the tendency towards conﬁrmation bias and
related risks of missing disconﬁrmatory evidence (Klayman and
Ha, 1987). The principle bias here is that I will lack sufﬁcient
critical insight into GSR practices and therefore relatively more
critical of CSA practices. To minimize these risks I have applied
two strategies: ﬁrst, retrieving documentary and other research
evidence to support claims about GSR and CSA practices based
on personal experience, and second, utilizing relevant conceptual
frameworks from the wider literature to systematically analyse the
accepted conceptual space under review.
The ﬁrst of these strategies is clearly limited by the lack of
published peer-reviewed research of the same objects of study:
GSR and CSA practices. This volume contains one of the only
empirical studies to observe GSR practice more systematically
than my account (Kattirtzi). Further, a broad search in Scopus for
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“chief scienti*” AND advis* in titles, abstracts and keywords
returns only 45 citations (February 2016), just one of which is a
peer-reviewed study including UK CSAs (Dunlop, 2010). Thus I
am left mainly to draw on my own experience supplemented by
reference to government documents.
In addition, this approach is also subject to some ethical
considerations: none of the actors implicated in the episodes I
draw on below have given their consent. While this kind of covert
reporting can be ethically acceptable under the British
Sociological Association (2002) code of ethics, I have erred on
the side of caution in limiting the reporting of details that might
identify speciﬁc individuals. This naturally means some elements
of my testimony are not available to scrutiny, but nevertheless I
have attempted to report the key elements as clearly as I can.
Framework for analysis. To explore how these two approaches to
science advice compare—and to mitigate some of the analytic
risks arising out of my method identiﬁed above—I will deploy
two orthogonal approaches to understanding science advice
drawn from the public administration and sustainability litera-
tures. The ﬁrst approach is the tableaux for the deployment of
expertise described by Page (2010) that covers the organizational
relationship between (science advice) experts and non-experts.
These cover (1) the bureaucrat as expert; (2) the bureaucrat as
mobilizer of expertise; and (3) the bureaucrat as the servant of the
expert. Each of these different tableaux create different power
relationships between the expert (in this case scientist) and the
non-expert (in this case the non-science policy ofﬁcial). Impor-
tantly, this of course has implications for the level of inﬂuence
that the science advisor has over any subsequent policy decisions.
This relationship thus is different from but impacts on the second
approach.
The second is the approach to understanding effectiveness of
science advice seen through the lens of “knowledge systems” for
sustainability, as described by Cash et al. (2003). In their
approach, Cash et al. deﬁne three properties for the effective
inﬂuence of scientiﬁc information in addressing policy issues:
credibility (the extent to which the science itself stands up to
scrutiny), salience (how relevant the science is to the decision
makers) and legitimacy (the degree to which bias is seen to
inﬂuence the generation of the advice). Cash et al. themselves
recognize an inherent tension in attempting to deliver all three
attributes via any single approach. What is crucial here is
understanding how the different approaches to deploying
individuals give rise to different degrees of effectiveness seen
through Cash et al.’s lens.
To understand how Page’s tableaux shed light on the
deployment of CSAs and GSR staff in the UK ministerial
departments, it is important to have a general orientation to the
nature of the hierarchy within the UK civil service.
The organizational geography of science advice in UK minis-
tries. For this article I will restrict my analysis to the 16 major UK
ministerial departments. These comprise the departments with
portfolios covering the vast majority of government spending and
are thus the principle mechanisms for national policy-making in
the United Kingdom. These are sometimes known as the “min-
istries of state” but within the civil service they are known as
“departments”, and I will use that term here. GSR staff and CSAs
exist in other bodies as well, including non-departmental public
bodies such as regulators (for example, Ofgem) and delivery
agents (for example, Environment Agency).
Within each of these departments, a civil service hierarchy
exists visible both in publically available organograms, in
published academic research (for example, Page and Jenkins,
2005) and consistent with my experience. Understanding this
hierarchy is important to compare the way in which power or
inﬂuence of expertise is deployed (cf. Page, 2010). The hierarchy
essentially comprises two major levels—an upper level (the
“senior civil service” with around four to ﬁve sublevels) and a
lower level (with around ﬁve to six sublevels). At the upper part of
this lower level are a signiﬁcant number of civil servants, who are
typically the ones directly responsible for generating the material
for creating policy options (Page and Jenkins, 2005)—it is at this
level where I spend the majority of my career. Around 90 per cent
of the approximately 4203 GSR staff deployed in ministerial
departments are in the upper parts of the lower level. GSR staff
are typically not visible on publically available organograms of
departmental structures because such diagrams tend to bottom
out at the lower end of the senior civil service. This perpetuates
the image of social science advice being hidden, low priority or
camouﬂaged in policy-making, as opposed to the higher proﬁle
science advising of CSAs.
GSR staff are usually deployed in departments in one of two
ways: either they are part of a centralized team, where they all sit
contiguously in the same area of an open plan ofﬁce (often with
the other analytic disciplines, where space allows), or they will be
embedded into policy teams. If embedded, they will normally sit
adjacent to other analysts (if they are also embedded, such as
economists) and non-analytic policy ofﬁcials, and separated from
the majority of other GSR staff in the department. Importantly, if
in a centralized team, the group leader will typically be a member
of GSR (as I experienced in then Department for Education
and Skills, 2003–2006) if there are sufﬁcient GSR staff. If
embedded, their group and team leader will very likely be a
non-analytic policy ofﬁcial (as currently is the practice in DECC).
Both these forms of deployment are visible currently within the
UK DECC, and each form has implications for the level of power
an individual GSR ofﬁcial will have in shaping any research
projects.
The 16 currently serving CSAs in the ministerial depart-
ments almost always sit near the top of the senior civil service
hierarchy. Currently, for instance, the CSA for DECC is presented
as sitting alongside the most senior civil servant, the permanent
secretary (see: www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/ﬁle/477367/decc-organogram-external.pdf, accessed
22 December 2015), similar to the Department for the Environment,
Food and Rural Affairs (see: www.gov.uk/government/uploads/
system/uploads/attachment_data/ﬁle/396856/RFI6952_Defra_at_
a_glance_01_oct_14_for_FOI_release_amended.pdf, accessed 22
December 2015) (Defra) and the Department for Transport (see:
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data
/ﬁle/485342/dft-organisation-chart.pdf, accessed 22 December 2015).
So far we have seen how GSR and CSA staff are deployed very
differently into the civil service. But the differences are not simply
limited to the places where they are deployed or the number of
staff, but also to the way in which they interact with policy and
the expertise they bring to science advice. I now turn to Page’s
tableaux to focus on three classes of relationship with policy that
Page identiﬁed across six European jurisdictions. These serve as a
useful point of department to elucidate the different kinds of
relationships CSAs and GSR have with non-analytic policy
ofﬁcials.
Bureaucrat as expert? CSAs and members of the GSR differ in
their approach to membership of the civil service—that is, whe-
ther they are formally a bureaucrat or not. A typical CSA is not a
civil servant, but is seconded into the ministry on a temporary
basis, retaining their position as a member of an external orga-
nization (Government Ofﬁce for Science, 2015: 9). All GSR staff,
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by contrast, are permanent members of the civil service by deﬁ-
nition (www.gov.uk/government/organisations/civil-service-gov
ernment-social-research-profession, accessed 5 April 2016). This
means that in a formal sense, the CSA is (typically) not a
bureaucrat. The importance of this is reinforced by the fact that
CSAs typically have no management responsibility, so have no
administrative role in the institution. GSR staff (especially those
in the upper part of the lower level of the hierarchy) commonly
have administrative or management duties alongside their role as
social science research experts. This administrative and man-
agement role has at least two implications for science advice. The
ﬁrst is that it (both logically and in my personal, practical
experience) reduces the time available for science advice directly:
the more time spent with team management and administration,
the less time available for research planning or quality assuring
research or advice. The second implication arises out of the ﬁrst:
as a corporate manager, there is a pressure to reinforce the culture
and support the goals of the organization to which you belong
and represent as a senior leader. Consequently, the room for
manoeuvre in critiquing the policies of the organization of which
you are a member is constrained. Such GSR staff have—as I
experienced continuously as a senior leader in the GSR cadre—
dual loyalties: to the GSR profession on the one hand, and to the
parent department on the other.
While, in my experience, this dual loyalty did not necessarily
generate conﬂict (since the role of GSR staff was to deploy social
science methods to make departmental decisions more defen-
sible), when it did the conﬂicts can be difﬁcult to navigate. For
instance, when working in the DCMS in 2009, I was tasked by a
policy team leader with commissioning a survey to capture an
estimate of the level of public support for using the UK television
licence fee to support local and regional television, diverting
funds from the BBC directly. This was a highly contested space
publicly—the BBC were keen to show the public were against this
idea, and defend their income. Policy ofﬁcials within DCMS were
keen that the survey provided a robust defence to the ministerial
position, so I was mandated with ensuring the methods were
defensible under scrutiny. This meant that I was able to shape the
approach mostly according to GSR standards, but at speciﬁc
points there were split loyalties and critical trade offs. For
instance, the most robust kind of sampling for this kind of social
survey would be random probability, but to execute that survey
would incur signiﬁcant additional ﬁnancial cost and increased
time to execute. Further, the beneﬁts to the DCMS of this are
actually minimal—it was unlikely that the survey sampling
method would ever be a key point of contention following
publication of the data. As such, I conceded ground to
departmental loyalty, and commissioned a survey with a relatively
weak sampling approach (an omnibus survey using quotas drawn
from random location sampling). Similarly, but more impor-
tantly, question wording and ordering came under scrutiny.
As can be seen in the ﬁnal report (Hamlyn et al., 2009: 53),
Question 13 attempts a relatively neutral framing of a key
question “Which of these comes closest to your personal
opinion?”—reﬂecting the impact of good GSR practice of
avoiding leading questions. However, the options presented are
clearly framed in a way to suit departmental preferences. In
particular, the second option as listed “there should be a choice of
TV channels to watch regional news” is framed in a way that
clearly pitches a commonly accepted beneﬁcial concept (more
choice) with TV channels to watch regional news without any
cost. A more neutral presentation would have built in the trade off
—that the beneﬁt has to be paid for. Without including that cost
in the question framing at that point, it likely biased responses in
favour of getting “more choice” without more expense (this was
reﬂected in the data with over 70% choosing more choice). I recall
having tense discussions about this question with the ofﬁcials
leading on the policy, and receiving signiﬁcant resistance to
making any changes. In the end, my need to retain good working
relations with these policy colleagues (I would no doubt need to
work with them again in the future) meant this framing remained
and adherence to GSR loyalty was relegated.
It is possible that CSAs can avoid this conﬂict by virtue of
having less sense of corporate “belonging”: they are very often still
part of their academic or industrial community, not a civil
servant, normally have little or no management responsibility and
a limited term in their role. This provides a better context for
them to be objective and independent but can at times be a source
of conﬂict if, in enacting their independence, they simultaneously
alienate the other senior leaders in the organization. This effect is
something I observed during my time at one department where
the CSA was at times viewed by some policy ofﬁcials as a non-
legitimate “hurdle” or “barrier” to gaining policy approval—some
reasons offered for this included the advice not being realistic, or
suggesting options that ofﬁcials felt had previously been shown
not to work. In such circumstances, I observed a tendency for
science advice from the CSA to be ignored or otherwise bypassed
as the level of apparent legitimacy within parts the organization
seemed to diminish. This is consistent with the notion of some
CSAs “rattling around” in their host departments, as Mulgan
(2013: 35) suggests.
In summary, GSR staff are both bureaucrats and experts,
whereas CSAs tend to be experts but not bureaucrats. For GSR,
this “insider” position gives them the ability to inﬂuence evidence
generation to an extent, but also means they may need to accept
constraints on that imposed by policy teams. This boosts their
legitimacy and salience but often at the expense of credibility
where that impacts on the science quality. For some CSAs their
position as outsiders requires careful navigation if they are to
retain legitimacy through providing salient advice and leverage
their credibility to positive effect.
Bureaucrat as mobilizer of expertise? Both CSAs and GSR staff
are supposed to act as mobilizers of expertise, within their own
domains—according to the ofﬁcial job descriptions of both roles.
The different ways in which each does this informative in
understanding how their inﬂuence is mediated by exploiting
salience, credibility or legitimacy. CSAs commonly call on their
own networks of experts gained over a lifetime of operating in an
academic domain. This network may be augmented by the
creation of a formal science advisory committee or council, where
the CSA attends a meeting of a wide range of experts either at a
strategic level for the ministerial portfolio as a whole (such as the
Home Ofﬁce Science Advisory Council (www.gov.uk/govern
ment/groups/home-ofﬁce-science-advisory-council, accessed 22
December 2015)) or for speciﬁc policy areas, such as the Advisory
Council on the Misuse of Drugs (www.gov.uk/government/orga
nisations/advisory-council-on-the-misuse-of-drugs, accessed 22
December 2015). Such committees existed both at the DCMS and
DECC when I was there (but neither with the same fully formal
status as that found in the Home Ofﬁce). While GSR staff may
also use their social science network to augment their analysis (as
I did on several occasions during my career), it is rare for them to
do so formally. The main exception to this is the Social Science
Expert Panel created to support DECC and Defra, which I helped
set-up and maintain from 2011 to 2013.
One of the main functions of GSR staff is to mobilize expertise
external to the civil service (see: www.gov.uk/government/
organisations/civil-service-government-social-research-profes
sion/about, accessed 5 April 2016). Most commonly this takes the
form of procuring policy research and evaluation projects from
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external expert suppliers. These projects are effectively social
research projects aimed at creating bespoke evidence for policy-
making. In essence, the GSR ofﬁcial is supposed to act as the
“intelligent customer” for the department, asking members of the
external expert research community to design and execute
programmes of research and analysis. Once an external expert
supplier is selected for a speciﬁc project, GSR staff are commonly
the main point of contact (and means of quality assurance)
between the external supplier and internal policy ofﬁcials. A key
element of this mobilization could therefore be described as
“chaperoning”: GSR staff such as myself and almost all the other
colleagues I worked or interacted with spent a signiﬁcant amount
of their time paying close attention to the activities of procured
external experts. My reﬂection on this is that such chaperoning
was a result of signiﬁcant reliance on private-sector research
expertise, rather than academic. Private sector expertise had
incentives (which they did not always follow) to trade off quality
with speed of delivery where they could, to overstate what was
possible, exaggerate quality and so on. Consequently, to maintain
good research standards, it was incumbent on GSR staff like me
to keep a close, critical eye on their activities and outputs.
Arguably, the key beneﬁt for this approach is the ability of the
GSR staff, together with external experts, to design tailored
research projects targeted directly at provisioning new empirical
evidence for the speciﬁc policy questions under consideration.
This lends the science advice derived from this process a level of
salience that is hard to match by other, more interpretive
approaches necessitated by making use of available (typically
academic) research knowledge or expertise—a ﬁnding consistent
with observations by Stevens (2010). It is worth recognizing that
the combination of a policy ofﬁcial who is responsible for the
policy, a member of GSR who works with the ofﬁcial and external
experts who gather data and undertake analysis under the
guidance of the GSR presents a potentially highly effective way of
bringing the beneﬁts of good science advice to policy.
However, there are also problems with this approach because
of the inevitable trade off between scientiﬁc rigour (supporting
credibility) and policy relevance (supporting salience, and with it
legitimacy), a trade off that Kieser and Leiner (2009) identify as
intractable, given their diagnosis of the nature of the social
systems involved. Arguably, one of the major challenges for the
GSR is the degree to which scientiﬁc decisions GSR staff make
about the quality of the research design for policy research or
evaluation projects are compromised/constrained by higher
priority policy criteria. For instance, while at DECC, I recognized
the limitations of the kinds of social data that were being collected
by DECC at that time. There were no major social surveys of
energy use for instance, only technical energy data and a limited
attitude tracker that helped monitor public opinion regarding
some aspects of DECC policy. This situation reﬂected the major
framing of energy policy as a primarily technical and economic
policy, where social science’s role was simply to monitor attitudes.
In attempting to change this situation by generating a vision for a
major social and technical survey that could be the DECC
equivalent of the English Housing Survey, I worked with
colleagues to set out a plan for a large-scale longitudinal survey.
The focus here was on bringing the best of social science
research design expertise to bear on a social and technical
challenge of managing national energy demand. Yet, the fact of it
being a social survey, the implicit scale and cost of such an
endeavour meant that—initially at least—the idea was initially
met with scepticism and resistance—even from my more senior
GSR colleagues. Of course, some of this resistance was the
resistance to new ideas (especially, I think, from a lower tier civil
servant). Importantly, I believe it was also symptomatic of a
department where policy priorities were shaped around technical
and economic thinking (cf. Lutzenhiser and Shove, 1999). As a
consequence, aspects of the social, so important in policy-making,
were given a back seat to such an extent that the only regular
major social survey being undertaken was a quarterly, quota-
sample omnibus survey of around 25 questions—signiﬁcant in
being the only ministerial department with such limited social
data on its portfolio.
For the CSAs I observed, the challenge of bringing physical
science evidence (as opposed to methods) into policy as a CSA
can create some difﬁcult situations with policy. From a relative
distance, I observed tensions between the CSA (including the
engineering teams in the division headed by the CSA) and some
policy teams across the department. In an internal study I
conducted to understand this relationship, I interviewed a
number of ofﬁcials who related episodes illustrative of these
difﬁculties. In one situation, ofﬁcials received conﬂicting
engineering advice from the CSA compared with advice from a
more junior engineer embedded in their team. Another ofﬁcial
reported that at times advice from the engineers (not necessarily
the CSA directly) was too “theoretical” leading to them placing
greater emphasis on “real world” expertise by consulting external
industrial experts. Finally, another ofﬁcial reported difﬁculties
around ownership of policy: they saw the existence of a CSA
together with a support team as another nexus of policy-making
power in the department, which served to confuse and delay
policy development.
These issues arose directly, it seemed, out of the application of
what we might call “science content” (that is, evidence and
theory) being about actual elements of the world (for example,
heritage buildings, wind turbines, consumer choice). This reliance
on content knowledge expertise contrasts with the methodologi-
cal expertise that is distinctive mark of GSR staff, who offer advice
based on what I will call “science process”. I argue that science
advice based on “science content” is more likely to lead you into
territory occupied by policy development than is “science
process”. As a consequence, the kinds of issues identiﬁed above
faced by a CSA are much less likely to happen with GSR staff
undertaking routine work based primarily on advice around
science process. This differentiation between science advice as
“science content advice” and science advice as “science process
advice” represents a key contribution of the analysis here, and is
one I return to below to explore in more detail.
Bureaucrat as a servant of expertise? Prima facie, one might
expect the GSR and CSA approaches to reach their strongest
point of contrast here, given the institutional arrangements
afforded to each. By being distributed among the lower ranks of
the civil service, by being embedded into policy teams, led by
policy ofﬁcials, the GSR has little option but to serve the (non-
science expert) bureaucrat, rather than the reverse. Indeed,
according to the former Chief Government Social Researcher, Sue
Duncan, it was part of the New Labour government’s approach to
the use of analysts to have them “on tap, not on top” (Burnett and
Duncan, 2008). This ﬁts with my experience, and as illustrated
above, where I, and other GSR staff I worked with tended to
privilege policy priorities over the priorities that might otherwise
take hold on the application of social science alone.
However, the picture is not that simple: GSR input—
principally “science process advice”—is shaped by the demands
of policy, but at the same time policy needs that input to be
shaped by the demands of the standards of research represented
by GSR—hence the focus on methodological expertise and
“science process advice”. So the bureaucrat voluntarily puts part
of themselves (or rather their policy) at the mercy of GSR
expertise. But they do so, I would argue, because of the
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beneﬁtting of from the standards of practice that the GSR
represent. They are able to control the direction of the research,
but feel assured that the content will be defensible on account of
the application of GSR methodological standards. Importantly,
such a process leads to the cocreation of “science content
advice” that falls out of the negotiated application of “science
process advice”. I explore the implications of this effect in the
conclusions below.
The problems with shaping policy through science content
advice arise, I argue, when the content comes from “unknown”
sources (that is, unknown to the policy ofﬁcial, in an
epistemological sense). If one looks at the world from the policy
ofﬁcial perspective (as opposed to the CSA or GSR perspective),
they are regularly confronted by different stakeholders offering
opinion, advice, input, lobbying and so forth regarding the
direction of the policy they manage for the minister. Science
content advice is another source of input. Scientists—including
both GSR and CSAs—will privilege this source as being derived
from the use of methodological norms, but ofﬁcials may not share
that perspective. GSR ofﬁcials get around this potential problem
by collaborating with the policy ofﬁcials on the generation of
policy research. Where CSAs rely directly on academic research
to source their advice, they run the risk of limiting the impact of
that advice through the disconnect between policy ofﬁcials’
perspectives and needs, and that which drove the original
research the CSA is drawing on.
“Science content advice” versus “science process advice”
Earlier I distinguished two subclasses of science advice: “science
content advice” on the one hand, representing advice to policy
derived from the use of published ﬁndings (evidence) or theory
developed in a particular ﬁeld; and “science process advice”
on the other, representing advice based on methodological
expertise. While both CSAs and GSR staff will use both, CSAs
are typically concerned with the use of “science content advice”
while GSR prioritize “science process advice”. Of course, the
main reason to deploy the latter is essentially to get to the
former: methodological expertise is of no use to policy in and of
itself, but as a means to an end. The end, crucially is bespoke
“science content advice”—evidence speciﬁcally about this part of
the world, at this time, from this angle. The question this
distinction raises is whether the provision of science process
advice is a better starting point in effective science advice than
science content advice.
We have seen above how the effectiveness of science process
advice relies on generating salient evidence. But at the same time,
it is clear that while the content is salient, to what extent does it
challenge the direction of policy-making? That is, to what extent
are the experts the servant of the bureaucrat? In the example I
gave about the DCMS survey, there was a clear tug of war
between what a neutral survey framing should be versus what the
policy ofﬁcials preferred, and commonly policy priorities win out
in areas that are important for effective science practice. The
noted trade off with credibility is really only credibility lost
potentially in front of external social scientists (that is, those who
have the ability to judge the quality of the science), whose opinion
has little effect on GSR careers. The reverse seems more true for
CSAs where they maintain a strong presence in their academic
ﬁeld and credibility is one of the highest priorities.
This implies that neither CSAs nor GSR have optimal
approaches—even if the conﬁnes of pragmatic policy-making
are taken into account: there is room for improvement. From the
above analysis two clear strategies emerge to strengthen the
impact of both in a way that improves policy through effective
challenge.
1. The CSAs need science content that is generated in a way that
maximizes the salience of the evidence to policy-making. This
could mean them adopting practices more similar to GSR, by
drawing much more on science process advice. But given their
role as leading experts, and their links to academic commu-
nities they may be better placed at inﬂuencing research
agendas (so they become much more policy-oriented—in
practice many already do) as well as the means of research—
which is something I have rarely if ever seen from a CSA. For
physical science and engineering research in particular this
means generating research content that has within it a means
of understanding the implications of choices in human and
social terms. This naturally demands an increase in inter-
disciplinary research at all levels (for example, Love and
Cooper, 2015). Although not a focus of this article,
interdisciplinarity across the social and physical sciences is
central to this.
2. The GSR need ways of reinforcing the prioritization of
scientiﬁc credibility of their work. At the moment, the GSR are
sealed off from academic world within their own GSR
community. By following the approach of the CSAs, the
GSR could take steps to link the career progression of GSR
staff to academic careers in some way, such as by having
academic representatives on promotion and recruitment
panels. Joint appointments between government departments
and academic institutions like CSAs may also reinforce this
but they also present a range of difﬁculties both for the
individual (in terms of identity, clear career progression) and
the institutions (in terms of contracting, restricted access and
data sharing and so on). Nevertheless, the process of exploring
this kind of arrangement could itself result in beneﬁts both for
GSR as well as academic researchers.
Importantly, neither of these strategies reﬂects a call for a CSSA—
a Chief Social Science Advisor. On the basis of my analysis such a
position would likely suffer the same issues as observed for some
current CSAs, and would represent the right answer to the wrong
question. The question should not be how we promote social
science in government, but how we get the best of our science into
governance? In my experience this is about applying the best
science process advice to policy problems, generating salient and
credible science content advice. Having effective advocates for
that approach who work both at senior and mid-tier levels in the
bureaucracy is likely a sine qua non for delivering more effective
science advice.
For me, one of the most important areas for future
development in science advice is the promotion of interdisci-
plinary science content—and with it interdisciplinary science
process. I argue that together they form the necessary basis for
more effective science advice. The potential beneﬁt of a combined
CSA-GSR model of science advice as sketched above may lie
more in the power to deploy “science process advice” with greater
independence into highly salient, policy relevant research
projects. I believe this approach has the potential to be a highly
effective tactic, where the desire for policy ofﬁcials to use science
advice to defend policy decisions can be used on policy
development to change those decisions for the better. I explore
this brieﬂy below.
Summary and conclusions
The tableaux described by Page (2010) provides a useful point of
departure for exploring different approaches to science advice
and relationships between science advisors and policy ofﬁcials.
In addition, the Cash et al. (2003) criteria for effective science
advice—credibility, legitimacy and salience—provide a means of
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understanding the trade offs the tensions visible in the different
modes of deployment between GSR and CSAs—and also a means
of understanding the points of similarity.
The scope of science advice—as represented by CSAs—has
been redrawn to include GSR. At a superﬁcial level, this includes
recognizing that science advice includes social science advice, and
that science advice may be undertaken not just by the
“charismatic megafauna” but also other parts of the ecosystem.
Importantly, we ﬁnd that when we look at how one element of
that ecosystem—GSR—executes science advice, we ﬁnd a
distinction in the deﬁnition of the “science” aspect becomes
pertinent, reﬂecting the methodological expertise exploited by
GSR in provisioning “science process advice”. I now turn to
explore the implications of “science process advice” for improving
the effectiveness of science advice overall.
The power of “science process advice”. The methodological
expertise that underpins GSR specialism provides an important
and distinctive feature of the contribution of the social sciences to
science advice for policy. This is not to downplay in any way the
importance of wider science content advice that the social sci-
ences provide, but it is something of a distinctive aspect of the
approach within the ecosystem of science advice. As argued
above, the focus on research methodology provides a non-
threatening form of expertise within policy: there is little scope for
knowledge about the design of focus groups, or survey design to
overlap with policy concerns. This non-threatening nature
enables easy collaboration with policy teams (within limits) but
also provides the GSR staff with the ability to perform particular
manoeuvres with policy, which when executed effectively, has the
potential to generate highly effective policy advice.
The logic runs that if ofﬁcials and ministers sign up to respond
appropriately to the outputs of research projects, then the trick is
to ensure the research ﬁndings do not simply reproduce the
answer policy ofﬁcials or ministers might “want”, implicitly or
explicitly. By making choices about the nature of the research
design and choice and deployment of methods, GSR staff (and
those who take a similar approach) are able to “win” on their own
terms (that is, make relatively uncontested choices about sample
size, perhaps sampling method—again, within limits) that clearly
affect the nature of the evidence returned. Importantly this is not
subject to personal biases—indeed the whole power of the
approach (that is, the scientiﬁc method) is in attempting to
remove personal bias—and so makes it harder to dismiss such
advice as reﬂecting a vested interest. The opening element of this
chain of logic—“if ofﬁcials and ministers sign up” is clearly an
important aspect of this, and explains too why signiﬁcant energy
in the GSR community has been expended in getting departments
to sign up to research publishing protocols (Government Social
Research, 2015). Such protocols help enforce this agreement by
departments publicly announcing the research and its outcomes.
This makes it harder to ignore evidence which they have
commissioned if it happens not to suit predetermined decisions.
To be sure, further empirical research is required to assess this
hypothesis and the conditions under which—if real—it occurs.
This analysis—along with Kattirtzi (this volume)—represents
one of the ﬁrst peer-reviewed analyses of the way social science
advice in government operates. For the social sciences in
government to beneﬁt, much more work is needed to properly
document and analyse what makes science advice effective—
indeed, what even the criteria for effectiveness should or could be.
From my perspective, the social sciences are well-placed to
undertake this work, but it must not be limited to GSR. To fully
grasp what might constitute effective science advice we will need
to understand how the standard ideas embodied within CSAs
might ﬁt or adapt to other aspects of the less understood parts of
the system.
Notes
1 As a 2013 Civil Service Quarterly blog indicates, the head of the GES is both the HM
Treasury Chief Economist and the Head of the GES: https://quarterly.blog.gov.uk/
2013/07/12/interview-with-dave-ramden-chief-economic-adviser-to-hm-treasury/
2 See: www.gov.uk/government/organisations/civil-service-government-social-research-
profession for more information about the GSR (accessed 23 December 2015).
3 Personal communication with GSR central ofﬁce, 30 October 2015.
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